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Summary
The Horn of Africa is located on a fault-line between two distinctly 
different strategies and philosophies for peace and security: the 
multilateral norms, principles and institutions that have been de-
veloped in Africa over the last 25 years, and the transactional pol-
itics of money and force of the Gulf monarchies. Today, the African 
peace and security architecture is jeopardized by the encroach-
ment of the political marketplace of the Arabian Peninsular.
Middle Eastern powers including Turkey, Egypt, Oman and Sau-
di Arabia have long been engaged in the politics and security of 
the Red Sea and the Horn. However, the twenty years after 1990 
marked an anomalous diminution of Arab engagement in the re-
gion, a period that coincided with unprecedented African activism 
on peace and security. In the last five years, old and new Middle 
Eastern actors have engaged with north-east Africa in full force. 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are using African troops 
and African bases in their military operations in Yemen. The UAE 
has used its financial muscle to promote political alignments in-
cluding the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace agreement. The Saudi-UAE co-
alition and the Turkey-Qatar alliance are rivals in bidding for the 
allegiances of political authorities in Somalia. 
This paper examines current practices of Middle Eastern engage-
ment in the Horn of Africa in historical context. It looks at the 
enduring paradox whereby the global powers of the day have en-
sured safety for shipping in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden alongside 
tolerating recurrent turmoil in the littoral countries. The paper ex-
amines how the regional peace and security architecture and pow-
er balances have changed since the 1980s, with the emergence of 
the norms, principles and institutions of a ‘Pax Africana’ and the 
entrenchment of security-coalition politics in the Arabian Penin-
sular, turning to the question of how the encounter between these 
two regions, with their widely differing capacities and approaches, 
is playing out. 
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Introduction
On 24 July 2018, Eritrean President Isseyas Afewer-
ki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed jointly 
received the Zayed Award, the highest award of Abu 
Dhabi, from the Crown Prince of the United Arab 
Emirates, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. 
The award was in recognition of the peace agree-
ment between the two countries, an initiative strong-
ly encouraged by the UAE, with financial rewards to 
match. A second agreement was signed in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia, in September. No details were made 
public.
Following reciprocal delegations to the two capitals 
in June, an agreement was signed bilaterally be-
tween Asmara and Addis Ababa at the beginning of 
July. However, it is notable that, for the first time in 
the history of the African Union and its predecessor 
the OAU, the Ethiopian leader did not attend the AU 
summit, held that month in Mauritania. The Eritrean 
leader has rarely attended, but it would have been 
expected that Ethiopia, as the host country of the AU 
headquarters, would been represented at the highest 
level. The AU is the custodian of the Algiers agree-
ment of 2000 that ended the war between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, and which was the basis for the 2018 
agreement.
This appears to represent a shift in the centre of po-
litical gravity for the Horn of Africa. In this paper I 
ask, is the Horn of Africa an integral part of the Af-
rican Union’s peace and security architecture? Or is 
it becoming an extension of the Middle East’s mer-
cenarized security politics? Is Ethiopia abandoning 
its national security framework, based on economic 
development and autonomy of action, and shifting 
towards becoming a junior partner in an Arab coa-
lition? I use as a frame of reference the ‘Red Sea are-
na’: the countries with coastline on the Red Sea, plus 
those neighbouring countries with great economic 
and political stakes in the Red Sea, such as Ethiopia 
and the UAE.
Two Geographic Axes
The Red Sea is one of the world’s strategic arteries. 
Long neglected in scholarship and policymaking, it 
has suddenly emerged as a priority for security pol-
icy in the Middle East, Europe, China and the United 
States. Disruptions to maritime traffic through the 
Red Sea have historically had far-reaching implica-
tions for economics and security in three continents, 
but there is no multilateral framework for managing 
the security of the arena. 
The Red Sea littoral countries are Egypt, Israel, Jor-
dan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, and Dji-
bouti. The Red Sea Arena includes nearby countries 
that may not have a coastline on the shores of the 
Red Sea, but which have an established legitimate in-
terest in the Red Sea. This category includes Somalia, 
which has a coastline on the Gulf of Aden. It includes 
Ethiopia and South Sudan on the African shore, both 
landlocked countries that depend on Red Sea ports 
for most of their international trade and which are 
intimately connected to the politics and security of 
the Red Sea littoral states. On the Middle Eastern 
side, the Red Sea Arena includes Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Iran and Turkey, all of 
which have security and commercial interests in the 
sea.
The geography and history of the Red Sea can be in-
terpreted on two axes: along and across the sea. 
Notably since the opening of the Suez Canal, the Red 
Sea became ‘an extreme example of a sea on the way 
to somewhere else’ (William Facey, quoted in Wick 
2016, p. 21). Maritime security has been a global se-
curity issue, of pressing interest to the world’s prin-
cipal powers—the British in the 19th and the first 
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half of the 20th century, the Americans since, and 
increasingly the Chinese. But whatever maritime se-
curity regime has been established for the Red Sea 
has been largely oblivious to the peace and security 
of those who live on its shores. The safety of shipping 
has co-existed with onshore turmoil.
The other axis is across the Red Sea, linking Africa 
and the Arabian peninsular. In the post-colonial era, 
the superpowers have tolerated onshore turmoil has 
included inter-state rivalry and engagement in inter-
nal wars, on both shores and across the sea. The Red 
Sea arena has been a theatre for rivalries and pow-
er games by second order powers. In the Cold War 
years, Arab countries were all engaged in the politics 
of north-east Africa. This pattern was interrupted 
in the 1990s, but has recently resumed with a ven-
geance.
Ali Mazrui (1986) provocatively asked, if the North 
African countries are seen as part of the continent, 
why not the Arabian peninsular too? Having identi-
fied the historical ties that bind the two shores, he 
wrote, ‘The most pernicious sea in Africa’s history 
may well be the Red Sea. This thin line of water has 
been deemed to be more relevant for defining where 
Africa ends than all the evidence of geology, geogra-
phy, history and culture.’ (p. 29) For the scholar, the 
chasm of the Red Sea is one that undoubtedly needs 
to be spanned. But for Africans, the Red Sea has also 
protected it from the mercenary politics of the Gulf 
monarchies. While the continent has developed mul-
tilateral mechanisms for peace, security and democ-
racy, the Arabian peninsular has deepened a form 
of transactional and militarized politics that can be 
characterized as an authoritarian and violent politi-
cal marketplace (de Waal 2015). 
The Red Sea divides policymakers in international 
institutions and western governments. Typically, a 
foreign ministry will have a Middle East department 
and an Africa department; the two will have different 
priorities and staff in them will have different back-
grounds and mindsets. This divide has been accentu-
ated by the historically anomalous situation during 
the period approximately 1990-2010, during which 
time there was relatively little Middle Eastern en-
gagement in the Horn, which coincided with a period 
when Africa established the norms, principles and 
institutions of a continental peace security architec-
ture. This architecture is not matched by anything 
comparable in the Arabian Peninsular, and it is in 
danger of being recklessly cast aside by Middle East-
ern powers that do not subscribe to its values.
The cross-Red Sea axis has been historically one of 
turmoil: of destabilization and the sponsorship of 
proxy wars. Meanwhile the maritime axis, from Suez 
to the Bab al Mandab, as part of the longer sea route 
between Europe and Asia, has been marked by safety 
for shipping. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 
made it into one of the world’s most important mar-
itime shipping routes. It cut nearly half the distance 
from the sea route between Britain and India. Today, 
somewhere between 7 and 10% of global maritime 
trade passes through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.
Constructed by the French, the Suez Canal was of 
greatest strategic importance to the British. The co-
lonial occupation of Aden and Somaliland (the latter 
administered from Bombay) followed, and most sig-
nificantly, the British occupation of Egypt, ostensibly 
in order to collect debts owed to British banks for 
the canal’s construction. In turn this led to imperial 
competition for control of the sources of the Nile and 
the ‘scramble for Africa.’ The countries bordering the 
Red Sea and in the Nile Valley were no more than 
pieces of real estate to be seized or traded as part of 
this tropical variant of the imperial great game.
The British takeover of Egypt and the canal was a 
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reason why the monumental stature by Frederic Bar-
tholdi, ‘Egypt bringing light to Asia’ was never built 
in Suez. Her sister was donated instead to the United 
States where she is known as the Statue of Liberty.
The laws of the freedom of the seas, in the form of 
Pax Britannica enforced by the Royal Navy, meant 
that the Red Sea was maintained in its paradoxical 
position of being the neglected axle of maritime im-
perialism, central to both intercontinental trade and 
the projection of naval power.
The Suez Canal famously played a central role in Brit-
ain’s post-imperial hangover. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
nationalization of the Suez Ca-
nal in 1956 spurred the kind of 
imperial adventure that would 
have been commonplace fifty 
or a hundred years prior, but in 
the era of decolonization it was 
instead a humiliation for Brit-
ain and its global standing. The 
aborted British-French-Israeli 
invasion closed the canal brief-
ly, and led to the wind-down of 
British influence in the Red Sea 
and the Gulf. 
Though it was a long unwind-
ing. For example, Britain re-
tained responsibility for main-
taining lighthouses on the 
islands of the southern Red 
Sea until 1989, when they were 
handed over to Yemen. (Lefeb-
vre 1998, p. 370) The Europe-
an-led counter-piracy naval pa-
trols, operation Atalanta, in the 
Gulf of Aden are coordinated by British officers from 
a base in the UK, though when Brexit comes into force 
these functions will be handed over to a Spanish ad-
miral and a French command and communications 
center. As the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also 
draws down, in part due to the fact that its EU fund-
ing is being reduced because of Brexit, it will also be 
hard for the UK to maintain its purported leadership 
of the international strategy for Somalia’s recovery. 
This is perhaps the coda to Britain’s significance in 
this part of the world.
The Suez crisis also illuminated the shared interests 
of the superpowers in freedom of navigation through 
the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. America was (and is) 
wedded to the security of maritime commerce, while 
for the Soviet Union, the canal was the principal na-
val route from the Black Sea-Mediterranean to the 
Indian Ocean. 
However, the absence of a security Leviathan created 
scope for the Red Sea to become an arena in which 
the secondary powers, especially those of the Middle 
East, could contest. The Egyptian-Saudi rivalry in the 
1960s, manifest in the Yemen war was one. Egyptian 
troops fought alongside Yemeni republican forces, 
with the clear intent of exporting revolution to the 
Gulf monarchies. That military-political agenda was 
ended by the 1967 war, which 
forced Egypt to bring its army 
home to fight against Israel. 
The Arab-Israel wars of 1967 
and 1973 closed the Suez Ca-
nal for eight years. This caused 
a major disruption to world 
maritime trade and contribut-
ed to economic crisis in coun-
tries dependent on the Red 
Sea for trade, such as Ethiopia 
and Yemen. It also illuminat-
ed that Israel shared with its 
Arab neighbors a key interest 
in maritime security in the Red 
Sea. Egyptian blockade of the 
Straits of Tiran, opposite Sharm 
al Sheikh in the Gulf of Aqaba, 
halted shipping to the port of 
Eilat in both 1956 and 1967. 
The Bab al Mandab is, for Isra-
el, the forward gateway to the 
Straits of Tiran and Eilat: mat-
ters of strategic priority for its defensible borders.
The expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt and the Ar-
ab-Israeli wars heightened tensions in the Red Sea. 
More was to follow, notably the dramatic reversals 
of Cold War allegiances by Ethiopia and Somalia, 
and the war between the two in 1977 that famous-
ly left détente ‘buried in the sands of the Ogaden’ 
(Woodroofe 2013). But the turmoil along the shores 
of the Red Sea had almost no perceptible impact on 
the security of the shipping lanes, even at the nar-
rowest point of the Bab al Mandab, where the paral-
lel lines of merchant ships are well within range of 
shore-based rockets. 
Bartholdi’s ‘Egypt bringing light to Asia’
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Onshore Turmoil and 
Maritime Security
In 1985, Boutros Boutros Ghali, then Egypt’s Minis-
ter of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote: ‘It is my ear-
nest hope that one day soon a conference of all the 
littoral States of the Red Sea will be convened, giving 
new impetus to co-operation and solidarity among 
these states’ (Boutros-Ghali 1985, p. xi). He contin-
ued, ‘Solidarity is the only valid means available for 
transforming the Red Sea into a zone of peace, co-op-
eration and friendship, a factor of peaceful co-exis-
tence among the peoples of the area rather than a 
zone of instability, tension and confrontation.’ 
However, as Jeffrey Lefebvre wrote twenty years ago:
In striking contrast to its security policy toward 
the Persian Gulf over the past five decades, the 
United States has never proposed a formal secu-
rity regime for the Red Sea region. Enhancing US 
military capabilities in the Red Sea was deemed 
politically unwise as well as militarily unnec-
essary. Since the mid-1970s, Egypt, Israel and 
Saudi Arabia have patrolled the northern Red 
Sea, while, in the southern zone, French naval 
capabilities that surpass those of local powers 
have ensured the security of the passageway to 
the Indian Ocean. In spite of the wars that have 
been waged along the southern Red Sea littoral, 
through the mid-1990s, maritime traffic in the 
region has been disrupted only briefly by a few 
isolated incidents (Lefebvre 1998, p. 368). 
This calm was disturbed by the short war between 
Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands in 1995-
96, but neither country was able or ready to escalate 
this militarily minor confrontation into a war that 
would threaten shipping, while France stepped up as 
the guarantor of the security of the Bab al Mandab 
and its approaches, from its military base in Djibouti 
(Lefebvre 1998, pp. 382-3). 
Writing in the mid-1980s, Roberto Aliboni identified 
three main trends in the politics of the region (Ali-
boni 1985). ‘Firstly, Saudi Arabia’s regional policies 
aimed at enhancing internal and external security 
have proven destabilizing and in a way even adven-
turous.’ (p. 116) 
Examples he provides, from the 1970s, are its foster-
ing divisions in Yemen, its role in promoting Soma-
li irredentism as a way of reducing Soviet influence 
(even to the extent of inadvertently encouraging Si-
yad Barre to start the Ogaden war), and its routine 
disregard for the norms of the OAU in supporting 
separatist movements in the Horn. 
Aliboni’s second trend is the Arab countries’ piece-
meal financial support for anti-Communist groups 
and for poorer governments ready to make friendly 
tactical moves. He argues that these tactical actions 
end up stoking local conflicts. He sees Saudi Arabia 
and Libya as guilty of this in different ways (p. 117). 
Third, Aliboni identifies the dominant factor in the 
politics of the Red Sea as relations among Arab states, 
and especially the rivalry along the ‘central axis’ of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He argues that Egyptian and 
Saudi policies towards the HoA were secondary out-
comes of their primary axis of rivalry in the Levant 
and Peninsular. 
All this is astonishingly resonant today.
Additionally, we can include a number of other ways 
in which the Middle Eastern powers were engaged 
in the Horn. During the Iran-Iraq war, both sides 
cultivated support in Sudan, where the Islamist 
movement under Hassan al Turabi had regional as-
pirations. Israel played a largely quiet game, occa-
sionally bursting into the spotlight, for example with 
its dramatic operations to extract the Beta Israel, 
also known as Falashas, from Ethiopia.
Note how little focus is given to promoting Islam. 
Saudi state policy was, briefly, to favor the Muslim 
Brothers, and subsequently and more significantly 
its own Wahhabists, and it has provided a very con-
ducive environment for private citizens and philan-
thropic organizations to promote Wahhabism across 
Africa. Labor migrants from African countries have 
also returned with many of the social mores and 
practices they acquired working in the Gulf. Wahhabi 
hostility towards Sufism has been very influential in 
Ethiopia and Somalia, but less so in Sudan, where it 
faced a sophisticated Islamist movement. However, 
Saudi state policy has been principally based on state 
interest and realpolitik.
Aliboni concludes his short book by drawing out 
the implications for western countries. He concurs 
with Boutros Ghali on the need for an explicit 
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articulation of a security regime.
In this uneasy regional context the western 
countries are practically absent. ... While West-
ern absence appears remarkable, in view of the 
crucial importance the Red Sea region is sup-
posed to have in the wider frame of the area 
South-east of NATO, this absence can hardly be 
explained today and could hardly be excused to-
morrow.... On the other hand, a direct Western 
presence in the region may be neither necessary 
nor politically wise. The West has powerful and 
prestigious allies, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
in the Red Sea. If these allies were to discard the 
destabilizing policies they have carried out in 
the past and promote instead policies of co-op-
eration both on the inter-Arab and Afro-Arab 
levels, the Western countries’ preoccupations 
with the area will lessen remarkably. In the end 
this would be the most correct path to the sta-
bilization and security of the region, and in this 
sense the most important conclusion of this 
book may be that it is up to the regional coun-
tries to manage stability around the basin by 
promoting co-operation among all the regional 
actors (pp. 118-9).
Terrorism and Piracy
It is striking that the two security issues that were 
top of the agenda for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
for the first decade of the 2000s, did not disturb this 
formula. One of those was terrorism. The Al-Qaeda 
terrorist attack on the USS Cole while it was refuel-
ing in Aden in October 2000 raised concerns about 
maritime terrorism. Subsequently, U.S. concern with 
AQAP in Yemen and Al-Shabaab in Somalia caused a 
counter-terror focus on the wider region. This led to 
the U.S. increasing its military footprint. 
In 2003, the U.S. established Camp Lemonnier in Dji-
bouti, as the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task 
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA), the U.S. military’s 
only permanent presence on the African continent. 
It was initially under CENTCOM and was transferred 
to AFRICOM in 2008. From Djibouti, the U.S. flies air-
craft and drones on missions in Yemen and Somalia. 
The U.S. has six other drone bases in the Horn (Ethi-
opia, Somalia, and Kenya). It conducts special forces 
operations in Yemen and Somalia. 
On both shores of the Red Sea, the U.S. had tactical 
partners (the Saleh government, the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, Ethiopia and Kenya), but their security part-
nerships were not guided by any political strategy 
for the region as a whole.
Much the same was true for piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
and western Indian Ocean. Attacks on commercial 
shipping by pirates based in Somalia led to wide 
ranging cooperation among the world’s navies to 
patrol the area. The biggest component was the 
EU Naval Force, known as Operation Atalanta (not 
confined to EU member states), set up in 2008. It is 
likely that an equally important factor in reducing 
piracy was the alternative employment provided by 
private security contractors conducting anti-piracy 
operations and also providing military services to 
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Somali political leaders.
The key point is that there has been excellent opera-
tional coordination among security actors on opera-
tions necessary to keep the sea lanes open, but that 
cooperation has not extended to any efforts to create 
a wider political order.
Israel
The U.S.’s closest security partner in the Red Sea 
arena is Israel, and the two states’ security interests 
have converged over the decades. Israeli policy and 
operations are conducted (for the most part) with 
extreme discretion. The basic element in Israeli pol-
icy is defense of its borders and access to the sea. 
The port of Eilat is on the Gulf of Aqaba, from where 
Israel conducts maritime trade through the Straits 
of Tiran and the Red Sea. Not only is Eilat a vulner-
able location because of its geography—a tiny strip 
of coastline adjacent to Egypt and Jordan and close 
to Saudi Arabia, but the Straits of Tiran are also a 
potential chokepoint. Israel’s defensible borders re-
quire an extended security perimeter reaching to the 
Bab al Mandab. Israel’s most pressing concerns for 
Eilat and reliable access to the Red Sea were secured 
in the 1970s with rapprochement with Saudi Arabia 
and the Camp David accords with Israel. Its security 
in the southern Red Sea has required working with 
the U.S., France, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and more dis-
creetly with Sudan and Saudi Arabia.
Israel and Ethiopia have had a longstanding shared 
interest in containing Arab-Islamic influence in the 
southern Red Sea. Their relations took an unexpect-
ed turn in the 1980s on the question of the Ethiopian 
Jewish community, known in Ethiopia as Beta Israel 
or Falasha. The extraction of Ethiopian Jews clandes-
tinely through Sudan in Operation Moses in 1984-
85 created controversy in Khartoum when it was 
revealed that Israel and the CIA had paid off senior 
Sudanese intelligence officers (Karadawi 1991). The 
later operation to airlift most of the remaining Ethi-
opian Jews from Addis Ababa in the last days of the 
Mengistu regime was briefly a prominent element in 
U.S. policy towards Ethiopia. 
In the last decade, one of Israel’s security priorities 
has been containing Hamas, including stemming 
arms flows to Gaza. One of the routes for these ship-
ments was from Iran to Sudan, from where they were 
smuggled up the Red Sea coast through Egypt. On 
several occasions, the Israeli airforce attacked and 
destroyed convoys of weapons in Sudan’s Red Sea 
state.
Pax Africana & 
Pax Ethiopica
In the 1990s, Middle Eastern political influence in 
the Horn dramatically ebbed, and African leaders 
began to construct their own continental peace and 
security order, an exercise that culminated in the Af-
rican Union’s peace and security architecture. 
Arab Disengagement from the Horn
Let me first examine the withdrawal of Middle East-
ern political engagement. This came about through 
several conjunctures. 
First, in 1990 Sudan came out in support of Sadd-
am Hussein’s invasion of Iraq. This happened when 
Hassan al Turabi overruled President Omar al Bashir, 
publicly humiliating him and violating a longstand-
ing precept of Sudanese foreign policy, which is that 
the country should be on good terms with Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia—preferably both, but always at least 
one. Turabi expected Islamist revolutions to sweep 
the Middle East. When that didn’t happen, Sudan be-
came isolated. Turabi set up the Popular Arab and 
Islamic Conference to challenge the Arab League and 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which 
brought together Iran and a host of extremist organi-
zations, including most famously Al-Qaeda.
This meant that the established modes of Middle 
Eastern engagement in Sudan were cut off. Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia applied diplomatic, financial and occa-
sionally military pressure, but their modes of doing 
business with Sudan, through the governing institu-
tions and prominent individuals, didn’t work. 
The polarization culminated in the attempted assas-
sination of Husni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995. 
This led to efforts by Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the 
U.S. to expel Al-Qaeda from the Horn. The intelligence 
services coordinated tactically, under the umbrella of 
pressing Sudan to cease being a state sponsor of ter-
ror alongside giving a green light to Ethiopian mil-
itary incursions into Somalia. This was successful: 
Al-Qaeda, which was born in Afghanistan but came 
of age in north-east Africa, was a spent force in that 
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region by 2001.
It is notable that this, the most successful count-
er-terror project of the last 25 years was undertaken 
without a U.S. or Middle Eastern blueprint. It is also 
intriguing that the presence of Usama bin Laden in 
Sudan, and other jihadists throughout east Africa, 
did not result in the region being enveloped by Mid-
dle Eastern politics.
Second, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and 
the failure of the U.S.-U.N. intervention in 1993 meant 
that the Arab countries didn’t know how to deal with 
Somalia. They had been accustomed to dealing with 
recognized leaders, and could not adapt their modus 
operandi for a stateless political system.
Third, the resolution of the Eritrean conflict and the 
new, albeit brief, Asmara-Addis Ababa axis shut out 
most Middle Eastern influence in those two coun-
tries. The brief Eritrea-Yemen war over the Hanish 
Islands in 1995-96 meant that Eritrea was at odds 
with its nearest Arab neighbour. Relations didn’t nor-
malize after an agreement was reached, and for the 
next twenty years Eritrea hosted some Yemeni dis-
sidents, including the Houthis, and maintained links 
with Iran.
African Peace and Security Architecture
Turning to the African peace and security order, this 
had continent-wide elements and Horn-specific ele-
ments.
Continent wide, what happened was that just as the 
Organisation for African Unity achieved its ultimate 
triumph—the liberation of South Africa from racist 
rule—its shortcomings as a mechanism for conti-
nental peace and security became terribly apparent. 
This occurred with the genocide in Rwanda, followed 
by the coup in Sierra Leone and the war in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo. The old OAU principles 
of respecting national sovereignty to the extent of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member 
states, and recognizing de facto rulers regardless 
of how they had come to power, were jettisoned in 
favor of new principles of ‘non-indifference’ and op-
position to unconstitutional changes in government. 
The OAU changed to the AU, incorporating these and 
other norms and principles in its foundational doc-
ument. 
The AU then began to construct an African peace and 
security architecture, with the AU Peace and Securi-
ty Council, preventative diplomacy, mediation initia-
tives, and peace support operations, as well as sup-
port to democratization efforts.
These have had mixed success but there has been an 
overall trend towards reducing civil wars and coups 
d’état, and of active African peacemaking efforts.
This was possible because of an alignment of sev-
eral factors. Principal among them was the mixed 
blessing of international neglect. In the 1990s, Africa 
dropped off the strategic map, which both contrib-
uted to crises, and thrust responsibility onto African 
leaders to address those crises. Progress was possi-
ble in part because a number of African leaders—no-
tably from South Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia—were 
ready to invest substantially in building new conti-
nental mechanisms, and supporting the principles 
behind them.
Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy and 
National Security Doctrine
Specific to the Horn, Ethiopia was the leading actor. 
By the early 2000s, Ethiopia was emerging as the 
hegemon in the Horn. It won the 1998-2000 war 
with Eritrea; it was defining the parameters of the 
political settlements in Sudan (with the Declaration 
of Principles for the resolution of the Sudanese con-
flict) and Somalia (the federal system); it was becom-
ing the largest contributor of troops to UN and AU 
peacekeeping operations; and it was developing fast 
with ambitious projects integrating its transport and 
power infrastructure with its neighbors. Ethiopia is 
the world’s most populous land-locked country and 
for the last fifteen years its economy has grown at 
between 8 and 10 percent per year. Ethiopia needs 
access to the sea, and it has built a new railway to 
Djibouti and roads linking it to ports in Sudan, So-
maliland and Kenya.
The national project of accelerated economic devel-
opment, under the direction of the central state, is 
also a security project. This can be seen most clear-
ly in the 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Security 
white paper. It is more an analysis of Ethiopia’s pre-
dicament and a statement of doctrine, than a policy 
paper as such. It was written by Meles Zenawi in the 
immediate aftermath of the war with Eritrea, partly 
as a rebuff to internal critics who argued that Ethio-
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pia should have pursued its war with Eritrea to the 
point of total victory, regardless of cost.
Instead, Meles made a number of points. He reiter-
ated the long-standing Ethiopian commitment to 
multiple balancing alliances and multilateral institu-
tions—a practice honed by Emperor Haile Selassie. 
More importantly, he stated that Ethiopia’s national 
objective was poverty reduction, and that nation-
al survival depended upon it. The country’s biggest 
threat wasn’t Eritrea. Nor was it the traditional Ethi-
opian fear of being surrounded by hostile powers. Its 
biggest threat was poverty, which was the founda-
tion of all its other weaknesses.
Meles’s policy had several key implications.
First was political investment in the African Union. 
This was a principled position but also a strategic 
one, consistent with Haile Selassie’s historic roles 
at the League of Nations and in founding the OAU. 
Ethiopia was instrumental in a number of initiatives, 
beginning with the International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities that studied the genocide in Rwanda, 
and proposed that the OAU should adopt the duty 
of non-indifference in the case of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. Ethiopia was in-
strumental in drawing up mechanisms for African 
peace support operations, and providing troops for 
several of them. But Ethiopia was also keen to share 
both the burdens and the credit.
Thus Ethiopia was active in a discreet manner to pro-
mote the Nile Basin Initiative, in part as a means of 
building an African coalition that could isolate Egypt 
on the continent. 
Ethiopia supported the norms, principles and institu-
tions of the African peace and security architecture.
On Somalia, Ethiopia acted unilaterally, invading 
Somalia in 2006 with the intention of eliminating a 
security threat, consisting of Eritrean military advi-
sors embedded within the security structures of the 
Islamic Courts. This was probably the biggest for-
eign policy blunder of Meles’s tenure. Recognizing 
that Ethiopian domination would be resented, Meles 
sought to establish an African cover for its military 
intervention, bringing in East African countries to 
supply troops for a peace enforcement mission. The 
Ugandan and Burundian troops were never suffi-
cient, however, and Ethiopia and Kenya both inter-
vened again with their own national armies. 
The second element of the Ethiopian foreign policy 
was autonomy, or proactive non-alignment. While 
Ethiopia’s model of a developmental state drew heav-
ily from China, Meles saw the rise of China primarily 
as a means of opening up the opportunities for an 
independent foreign policy, liberated from what he 
considered the straitjacket of the Washington con-
sensus. Ethiopia obtained enormous investment and 
support from China, but also maintained strong links 
with Europe (notably technical cooperation) and the 
USA (notably on counter-terrorism). 
By these stratagems, Meles aimed to avoid over-de-
pendence on any one external patron, and especial-
ly to avoid becoming dependent on any particular 
actors in the Middle East. He was fearful that Egypt 
would in due course have an active foreign policy and 
resume its historic pattern of isolating Ethiopia, and 
that Saudi Arabia—particularly if it were to fall un-
der the sway of an assertive Islamism—would sim-
ply overwhelm the Horn of Africa with its financial 
resources. His greatest fear was an alliance between 
Egypt and the Gulf monarchies, with Egypt guiding 
the policy and the oil states providing the money.
The MESA Modus Operandi
In some respects, Meles’s fear has come to pass. 
The putative Middle East Security Alliance con-
sists of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with 
like-minded second-rank powers such as Bahrain, 
Jordan and Kuwait. It is discreetly backed by Israel 
and openly promoted by the U.S., provided that the 
issue of Qatar can be resolved. The Alliance has been 
described as an ‘Arab NATO’ but it is not, in fact, a 
treaty organization intended for the defence of de-
mocracy, but an old-style military pact against a com-
mon adversary—Iran. The MESA is controversial 
within the region, and among American security and 
foreign policy analysts who fear that it will become a 
trap that drags the U.S. into a coalition for war (Miller 
and Sokolsky 2018). 
The potential power of this new alignment must be 
seen against two crucial background shifts: one re-
gional and economic, the other in global security.
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Economic Transformations
Over the last fifty years, the economic balance in the 
Red Sea arena has been transformed. In the 1960s, as 
for the previous century, the northern tier of the Red 
Sea was substantially richer than the southern tier. 
It remains so today. Between them, Egypt, Israel and 
Jordan are about 20 times richer in GDP than Djibou-
ti, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen, with only a slightly 
larger population.
Far more dramatic has been the transformation of 
the Gulf monarchies. In the 1960s they were at a 
comparable level of economic development to the 
countries of the Horn. Oil of course changed that. 
Today, the GCC countries are five times richer than 
the IGAD ones, with just a sixth of the population. I.e., 
GDP per capita in the GCC is 30 times that in IGAD.
This isn’t just a transformation of economic power 
relations, but social and cultural ones too. Millions of 
labour migrants have gone from Egypt and the Horn 
to the Gulf countries, and have adopted the religious, 
social and cultural mores of their hosts. They have 
also influenced their hosts—Sudanese professionals 
have been particularly significant in the development 
of public institutions in Qatar and the UAE, and in the 
growth of the Islamic humanitarian sector.
Within the Arab world, the economic center of power 
shifted from Egypt and the Levant to the petro-states. 
In the millennium this was followed by a shift in the 
center of political power, away from the secular, au-
thoritarian countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria, 
towards the Gulf monarchies. The events of 2011 
highlighted this.
The ascendancy of the Gulf monarchies represents 
not only a geographical shift but also the hegemony 
of a different set of interests and a radically different 
style of conducting politics. The secular authoritar-
ians promoted their interests through institutional-
ized alliances. The Gulf monarchs do it by dispensing 
cash in return for loyalty. Both used their militaries 
and intervene in civil wars afflicting their neighbors, 
but while the secular authoritarians mostly used 
their own troops, the oil sheikhs hire mercenaries 
and proxies for the ground war. Theirs is the politics 
of a transactional political marketplace.
Global Security Shifts
The second background factor is that, as in the years 
immediately following the 1956 Suez crisis, the se-
curity hegemon is departing. The 1990 Gulf War ush-
ered in a Pax Americana to supplement the late Cold 
War consensus on freedom of navigation. During 
the Obama Administration, the American security 
umbrella was folded and stashed away. Meanwhile, 
China’s astonishing economic growth meant that it 
had a new strategic interest in what it called ‘the far 
seas’. Prominent among these was the Red Sea. The 
‘One Belt One Road’ initiative includes a maritime 
corridor from China, through the Indian Ocean and 
the Red Sea, to Europe. China’s first overseas military 
base has been constructed in Djibouti.
The stakes have been raised, and the ports of the 
western Indian Ocean have become strategic assets, 
both commercial and military. The UAE’s Dubai Ports 
World is seeking to have a controlling influence in 
ports along the coasts of Yemen and East Africa. The 
UAE has de facto annexed the island of Socotra, Ye-
meni territory at the eastern gateway to the Gulf of 
Aden.
The immediate strategic priority of the MESA mem-
bers is countering Iran. The main theatres for com-
petition are the Persian/Arabian Gulf, Iraq and the 
Levant. Anticipating that Iran’s first step in a military 
confrontation would be to close the Straits of Hor-
muz, through which most of the region’s oil exports 
sail, Saudi Arabia has invested in infrastructure that 
opens up new export routes. It has built a pipeline 
to the Red Sea with port infrastructure at Yanbu and 
has advanced planning for another pipeline to Mu-
kallah in Yemen.
The Horn of Africa is a third tier priority for the Gulf 
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monarchs. Their overstretched foreign policy staffs 
and security advisors have little time and less exper-
tise on the area. The fact that delegations from Afri-
can countries and from the AU tend to arrive primar-
ily to ask for financial aid does not help. Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE tend to see Africans as supplicants, not 
as political partners. The proposition that the Afri-
can Union has painstakingly developed a peace and 
security architecture that is suitable for Africa—and 
in advance of anything that exists in the Arabian pen-
insular—is unlikely to cross their minds. 
In the early 2000s, Saudi and Emirati policy towards 
the Horn was chiefly focused on diminishing Iranian 
influence, especially in Sudan. Subsequently it has 
become much more complex. There are four addi-
tional elements and complications.
Gulf Economic Interests in the Horn
First is economic interest. The Arab countries have 
considerable and increasing commercial investments 
in Africa. With climate change, they see their food 
security partly vested in agricultural land in Africa. 
Dubai Ports World has been buying controlling inter-
ests in numerous ports, profiting from the fast-grow-
ing economies of East Africa, while also consolidat-
ing its extended maritime security strategy.
Egypt and the Nile Waters
Second is the question of the Nile Waters. This is of 
course a longstanding Egyptian issue, defined as not 
just national security but national survival. Egypt has 
long seen the Nile Waters issue as a zero sum game 
and hence sought to limit Ethiopia’s capacity to de-
velop its economy and utilize the Nile. Having iden-
tified accelerated economic growth as the core of its 
national security strategy, Ethiopia now has a match-
ing rationale. An alliance between Egypt and the UAE 
would therefore seem to pose an obvious threat to 
Ethiopia.
However, the Gulf countries don’t necessarily share 
the same interests as Egypt. In building the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia took advan-
tage of Egypt’s neglect of Africa and its political tur-
moil. It sought to bring Sudan round to its side, and 
one means of doing this was designing the dam in 
such a way that Sudan could make use of the addi-
tional year-round water to expand irrigated agricul-
ture. This is a more tangible threat to the level of Nile 
waters flowing to Egypt than Ethiopia’s regulation 
of the water level behind the dam, because Ethiopia 
needs the waters to flow for the purposes of gener-
ating electricity. The Sudanese sold the land leas-
es to, among others, Gulf investors. Along with the 
substantial commercial investment in Ethiopia, this 
means that Ethiopia has a stronger hand to play. 
Nonetheless, the African Union overplayed its hand 
when it suspended Egypt after the 2013 military 
takeover that brought Abdel Fatah al-Sisi to pow-
er. It was a principled action in conformity with the 
non-recognition of unconstitutional takeovers of 
power. It was reversed when al-Sisi was elected pres-
ident. But it also stung Egypt into engaging—in part-
nership with Morocco—in a determined pursuit of 
its interests within the AU.
The War in Yemen
Third is the war in Yemen. This is generating its own 
logic as the hostilities drag on. Having miscalculat-
ed in their assumption of a rapid victory, the Saudis 
and Emiratis are now in the all-too-common situ-
ation of a foreign power aligned with an incapable 
local proxy fighting an unwinnable war, without a 
strategy for face-saving exit. The Saudis and Emir-
atis need frontline fighters, and are unable to com-
mit their own forces. Consequently they have paid 
for and deployed 7,000 Sudanese troops, through 
a shadowy scheme whereby a senior official in the 
Sudanese presidency was paid off and provided with 
the protection of Saudi citizenship (Perry 2018). 
At one point, Eritrean combat troops were also en-
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gaged. The UAE’s principal air base for its operations 
in Yemen is Assab in Eritrea. Short-term tactical mil-
itary calculus means that the Gulf powers are locked 
more closely into their military partners, Sudan and 
Eritrea.
The GCC Dispute
Fourth is the dispute within the GCC, between Sau-
di Arabia and the UAE on one side, and Qatar on the 
other, along with the associated rivalry with Turkey.
The dispute originated in the contentious relations 
between the ruling families of Qatar and the UAE, 
going back several generations, and in Qatar’s sup-
port for the Muslim Brothers across the Arab world, 
and its accommodation with Iran. The dispute con-
tributed to a bidding war in the Horn, with Qatar and 
Turkey (on one side) and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and 
Egypt (on the other) seeking to secure the alignment 
of Sudan, Djibouti, Somaliland and numerous actors 
in Somalia. 
Within the Horn, this rivalry was overlaid with lon-
ger histories of involvement by the various actors. 
Qatar was the first of the Gulf Arab states to become 
involved in the current round of Middle Eastern en-
gagement in the Horn. It did so through its sponsor-
ship of the Muslim Brothers. This was a two-way 
process, insofar as Sudanese scholars, professionals 
and activists were instrumental in building the infra-
structure of the Muslim Brothers in the Gulf states. 
For example they were among the professional class-
es, including lecturers and journalists, who built the 
Islamist presence in universities and the media. They 
also started the first international Islamic humani-
tarian NGOs in the Arabian peninsular. And some of 
them had positions in the foreign service and even 
the intelligence services of Gulf states.
A decade ago, Qatar sought to position itself as the 
mediator of choice for conflicts across the region. It 
hosted a long series of peace talks for Darfur and was 
the mediator in the boundary dispute between Er-
itrea and Djibouti. 
Turkey was the first mover into Somalia, opening 
the first foreign embassy in Mogadishu, providing 
humanitarian relief in the 2011 famine, and under-
taking a number of morale-boosting steps such as 
starting a municipal waste collection service in Mog-
adishu. Turkey built and finances the new Somali 
military academy.
The Saudis and Emiratis moved later, but with more 
money, and a style of political engagement focused 
on direct patronage, along with some strategic com-
mercial investments (ports and private security 
companies). For them, the Horn is primarily part of 
their security hinterland. It is not only a rivalry for 
allegiance, but a different style of politics. The Emi-
ratis in particular have become known for taking a 
hard for-us-or-against-us line. Neither country has 
a strong reputation for following up on its financial 
pledges, which means that their influence may be 
less than it appears from news coverage. Their cli-
ents in the Horn—especially in Somalia—will tend 
to play along in order to get the first cash payment, 
but keep open their cooperation with the Qataris and 
Turks, whose investments are more institutional and 
reliable.
There have, however, been some notable shifts. Er-
itrea abandoned the Houthis and Iran in 2015 and 
moved decisively into the Saudi-Emirati camp. Sudan 
embraced the Saudi war in Yemen as a route to in-
ternational respectability, including military coop-
eration with Saudi Arabia and Saudi and Emirati ad-
vocacy in Washington for the lifting of U.S. financial 
sanctions.
The biggest shift is in the style of politics. It is a shift 
of degree, but a possibly decisive one.
Several of the countries of the Horn—Somalia, Su-
dan—are already functioning as political markets in 
which power is a tradable commodity, and loyalties 
are bought and sold, often in auctions to the highest 
bidder. The involvement of the Gulf states reinforced 
any tendency towards the marketization of politics. 
Those states that haven’t functioned as political mar-
kets—notably Ethiopia—appear to be moving sharp-
ly in that direction. There are internal and external 
reasons for this. Among them is the readiness of the 
new leadership to turn to Gulf sponsors for financial 
bailouts.
Politicians in the Horn play the Middle Eastern rival-
ries to the best of their abilities. Some are astute—
Sudan’s Omar al Bashir is particularly accomplished. 
Isseyas Afewerki has played a weak hand well. Dji-
bouti’s Ismail Omer Guelleh has positioned itself as 
a friend to all, but has made some apparent tactical 
miscalculations with the UAE. Some are novices, such 
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as Abiy Ahmed, and have probably sold themselves 
short. Somali politicians have relished the rivalries 
between the Middle Eastern countries and the ways 
in which this increases their room for maneuver, and 
increases the market price of their political align-
ment.
Towards a Red Sea Forum?
An enduring theme of this paper has been the ab-
sence of any multilateral framework for managing 
peace and security in the Red Sea arena. The obvious 
step towards this would be the convening of a forum 
of Red Sea states. This idea has been raised several 
times but never pursued. 
In 1977, leaders of conservative Arab countries met 
in Sana’a to form a Red Sea council as an anti-Com-
munist coalition. In the 1980s, Egypt proposed such 
a forum. 
We can surmise three reasons why no forum has 
been established. The first is that the most pressing 
immediate concern, maritime security, has been suc-
cessfully managed by ad hoc operational coalitions.
A second reason is that there are deep divisions over 
who should be represented in such a forum. The 
most divisive issue would be whether Israel could 
be a member, but the involvement of other countries 
with a strong political, commercial or security stake 
in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden—such as Ethiopia, 
Oman and the UAE—would also be controversial.
A third reason is that in international organizations 
(such as the United Nations and the World Bank) 
and foreign ministries (such as the U.S. Department 
of State and the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice), there is an enduring problem of bureaucratic 
and academic organization which is that the Red Sea 
is divided between Africa and the Middle East/Asia. 
The AU and the GCC have not, until now, had exter-
nal affairs departments and strategies. The League of 
Arab States, whose members include all the Red Sea 
littoral states excepting Eritrea and Israel, is inactive. 
A similar divide exists in academia: a Red Sea studies 
program would fall afoul of the Africa-Middle East 
area studies divide.
The idea of a Red Sea forum is resurgent today. In 
Washington DC, the combination of this institutional 
divide and the emerging strategic importance of the 
Red Sea has provided the rationale for an important 
effort by the U.S. Institute of Peace to focus on the 
region, including advocating for a U.S. Special Envoy 
for the Red Sea (Knopf 2018). Most active to date has 
been Alex Rondos, European Union special envoy for 
the Horn of Africa (Rondos 2016), and the region is 
a prime candidate for applying the EU’s holistic ap-
proach to traditional security and human security 
(de Waal and Ibreck 2018). 
There has been discussion at the African Union about 
developing an ‘external action policy’ for peace and 
security in the ‘shared space’ of the Red Sea/Gulf of 
Aden, including establishing political and security 
partnership with the GCC (World Peace Foundation 
2016). Meeting in Khartoum in October 2017, under 
the auspices of the African Union, representatives 
of north-east African states and international part-
ners (principally the European Union) developed an 
agenda for expanding its peace and security agenda 
for the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea arena. 
The AU has struggled with moving this agenda. The 
Red Sea issue has not been championed by a member 
state. Egypt and Sudan pursue their relations with 
Arab states bilaterally; Ethiopia has been deeply sus-
picious of any engagement; Eritrea has not wanted 
to bring the AU into its own dealings across the Red 
Sea; and Somalia has not had a coherent government. 
Djibouti, the African Red Sea state with the deepest 
interests, introduced the subject at the AU Peace and 
Security Council in November 2018.
The AU will need to move quickly if it is to keep up 
with events. In December 2018, a few days after 
the annual gathering of the GCC member states in 
Riyadh, the King of Saudi Arabia hosted a summit 
of seven ministers of foreign affairs representing 
countries lining the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Those 
who attended were: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Dji-
bouti, Somalia, Yemen and Jordan. Notably absent 
was Eritrea, with no explanation given or apparent. 
Also interesting were the failure to invite Ethiopia 
and the UAE, and the absence of the GCC itself as well 
as the League of Arab States and the AU (Al-Awa-
ti 2018; Al-Wasmi 2018). The ad hoc nature of the 
Saudi summit—in terms of participants, agenda and 
outcome—indicates the likely direction of future se-
curity policies, with or without the formal establish-
ment of MESA.
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Concluding Thoughts
The politics of the Red Sea arena today follows an 
age-old pattern, in which the security and commer-
cial interests of world powers and regional powers 
dominate the interests of the people of the Horn.
There is a resurgent rivalry over who has control of 
the security of the maritime trade. This is eminently 
manageable, given that the interests of all of the play-
ers are aligned in favor of freedom of navigation, so 
that any differences are unlikely to erupt into a con-
flict that closes the sea routes. All actors are likely 
to cooperate in suppressing maritime piracy or ter-
rorist threats to shipping, given that about US$750 
billion worth of shipping passes this way.
This quiescence continues in parallel to, and unaf-
fected by, onshore turmoil on both sides of the Red 
Sea.
Elements of the trans-regional politics of the Red 
Sea arena are unchanged: Middle Eastern countries 
using their greater power to influence the politics of 
African ones, driven by a mixture of economic and 
security interests, while superpower interests re-
main in the background. The U.S. is withdrawing, the 
European Union is deeply concerned but unable to 
exert any significant leverage, and China is becoming 
entangled but without evident strategy beyond mar-
itime security.
In the last generation, Africa has developed a crucial-
ly important peace and security architecture, includ-
ing norms, principles and institutions. The Arabian 
Peninsular lacks any such peace and security system, 
and suffers on account of it. The Gulf monarchies 
would do well to learn from the African experience, 
but it is unlikely that their leaders are minded to do 
so.
Some of the Middle Eastern players are familiar, such 
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with Israel keeping a low 
profile. Some are old players returning to the fray, 
such as Turkey. Some are new: Qatar and the UAE. 
But the overall trend is towards an extension of the 
dominant form of Gulf politics to the Horn, driven by 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is a politics based on 
narrowly-defined security interests and conducted 
through transactions in the political marketplace, 
with at best ad hoc multilateralism such as the MESA.
This is riding roughshod over the Pax Africana and 
the Pax Ethiopica. It is reducing the autonomy en-
joyed by the African actors from having the strategic 
option (albeit limited) of building their own political 
orders (national and continental), to having only tac-
tical options of maneuver within a political market.
Scholars and proponents of policies for peace and 
security need to span the pernicious divide of the 
Red Sea. In the long term, this can bring coherent 
narrative and analysis to a much neglected region, 
and promote understanding and cooperation. More 
immediately, this can help protect the African shore 
from the mercenarized political market of the Arab 
peninsular.
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